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Abstract — The term that flourished in the IT
industry is the Cloud Computing. Inspired and
Motivated by the tremendous growth and the huge
success of cloud, we propose a new decentralized
access control scheme for secure data storage in
clouds that supports anonymous authentication. In
the proposed scheme, the cloud verifies the
authenticity of the series without knowing the user’s
identity before storing data. Our scheme also has the
added feature of access control in which only valid
users are able to decrypt the stored information.
The scheme prevents replay attacks and supports
creation, modification, and reading data stored in
the cloud. We also address user revocation.
Moreover, our authentication and access control
scheme is decentralized and robust, unlike other
access control schemes designed for clouds which
are centralized. The communication, computation,
and storage overheads are comparable to
centralized approaches.




Cloud computing has been gaining a lot of attention
and attracting the researches to delve into from both
academic and industrial worlds. In cloud computing,
users can outsource their computation and storage to
servers (also called clouds) using Internet. This frees
users from the hassles of maintaining resources on-site.
Clouds can provide several types of services like
applications (e.g., Google Apps, Microsoft online),
infrastructures (e.g., Amazon’s EC2, Eucalyptus,
Nimbus), and platforms to help developers write
applications (e.g., Amazon’s S3, Windows Azure).
Much of the data stored in clouds is highly
sensitive, for example, medical records and social
networks. Security and privacy are, thus, very important
issues in cloud computing. In one hand, the user should
authenticate itself before initiating any transaction, and
on the other hand, it must be ensured that the cloud
does not tamper with the data that is outsourced. User
privacy is also required so that the cloud or other users
do not know the identity of the user. The cloud can hold
the user accountable for the data it outsources, and
likewise, the cloud is itself accountable for the services
it provides. The validity of the user who stores the data
is also verified. Apart from the technical solutions to
ensure security and privacy, there is also a need for law
enforcement.
Recently, Wang et al. [1] addressed secure and
dependable cloud storage. Cloud servers prone to
Byzantine failure, where a storage server can fail in
arbitrary ways [1]. The cloud is also prone to data
modification and server colluding attacks. In server
colluding attack, the adversary can compromise storage
servers, so that it can modify data files as long as they
are internally consistent. To provide secure data
storage, the data needs to be encrypted. However, the
data is often modified and this dynamic property needs
to be taken into account while designing efficient
secure storage techniques.
Efficient search on encrypted data is also an
important concern in clouds. The clouds should not
know the query but should be able to return the records
that satisfy the query. This is achieved by means of
searchable encryption [3], [2]. The keywords are sent to
the cloud encrypted, and the cloud returns the result
without knowing the actual keyword for the search. The
problem here is that the data records should have
keywords associated with them to enable the search.
The correct records are returned only when searched
with the exact keywords.
Security and privacy protection in clouds are
being explored by many researchers. Wang et al. [3]
addressed storage security using Reed-Solomon
erasure-correcting codes. Authentication of users using
public key cryptographic techniques has been studied in
[4]. Many homomorphic encryption techniques have
been suggested to ensure that the cloud is not able to
read the data while performing computations on them.
Using homomorphic encryption, the cloud receives
ciphertext of the data and performs computations on the
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ciphertext and returns the encoded value of the result.
The user is able to decode the result, but the cloud does
not know what data it has operated on. In such
circumstances, it must be possible for the user to verify
that the cloud returns correct results.
Considering the following situation: A law student,
Alice, wants to send a series of reports about some
malpractices by authorities of University X to all the
professors of University X, research chairs of
universities in the country, and students belonging to
Law department in all universities in the province. She
wants to remain anonymous while publishing all
evidence of malpractice. She stores the information in
the cloud. Access control is important in such case, so
that only authorized users can access the data. It is also
important to verify that the information comes from a
reliable source. The problems of access control,
authentication, and privacy protection should be solved
simultaneously. We address this problem in its entirety
in this paper.
Our Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are the following:
1. Distributed access control of data stored in
cloud so that only authorized users with valid
attributes can access them.
2. Authentication of users who store and modify
their data on the cloud.
3. The identity of the user is protected from the
cloud during authentication.
4. The architecture is decentralized, meaning that
there can be several KDCs for key management.
5. The access control and authentication are both
collusion resistant, meaning that no two users can
collude and access data or authenticate themselves,
if they are individually not authorized.
6. Revoked users cannot access data after they
have been revoked.
7. The proposed scheme is resilient to replay
attacks. A writer whose attributes and keys have
been revoked cannot write back stale information.
8. The protocol supports multiple read and write
on the data stored in the cloud.
9. The costs are comparable to the existing
centralized approaches, and the expensive
operations are mostly done by the cloud.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we propose our privacy preserving
authenticated access control scheme. According to our
scheme a user can create a file and store it securely in
the cloud. This scheme consists of use of the two
protocols ABE and ABS, as discussed in Sections 3.4
and 3.5, respectively. We will first discuss our scheme
in details and then provide a concrete example to
demonstrate how it works. We refer to the Fig. 1. There
are three users, a creator, a reader, and writer. Creator
Alice receives a token _ from the trustee, who is
assumed to be honest. A trustee can be someone like
the federal government who manages social insurance
numbers etc. On presenting her id (like health/social
insurance number), the trustee gives her a token _.
There are multiple KDCs (here 2), which can be
scattered. For example, these can be servers in different
parts of the world. A creator on presenting the token to
one or more KDCs receives keys for
encryption/decryption and signing. In the Fig. 1, SKs
are secret keys given for decryption, Kx are keys for
signing. The message MSG is encrypted under the
access policy X. The access policy decides who can
access the data stored in the cloud. The creator decides
on a claim policy Y, to prove her authenticity and signs
the message under this claim. The ciphertext C with
signature is c, and is sent to the cloud. The cloud
verifies the signature and stores the ciphertext C. When
a reader wants to read, the cloud sends C. If the user has
attributes matching with access policy, it can decrypt
and get back original message. Write proceeds in the
same way as file creation. By designating the
verification process to the cloud, it relieves the
individual users from time consuming verifications.
When a reader wants to read some data stored in the
cloud, it tries to decrypt it using the secret keys it
receives from the KDCs. If it has enough attributes
matching with the access policy, then it decrypts the
information stored in the cloud.
Figure 1: Our secure cloud storage model
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Data Storage in Clouds
A user Uu first registers itself with one or more
trustees. For simplicity we assume there is one trustee.
The trustee gives it a token
where p is the signature on ukKbase signed with the
trustees private key TSig (by (6)). The KDCs are given
keys PK[i], SK[i] for encryption/ decryption and
ASK[i] ; APK[i] for signing / verifying. The user on
presenting this token obtains attributes and secret keys
from one or more KDCs.
The original work by Maji et al. [24] suffers from
replay attacks. In their scheme, a writer can send its
message and correct signature even when it no longer
has access rights. In our scheme a writer whose rights
have been revoked cannot create a new signature with
new time stamp and, thus, cannot write back stale
information.
Reading from the Cloud
When a user requests data from the cloud, the cloud
sends the ciphertext C using SSH protocol. Decryption
proceeds using algorithm ABE:Decrypt(C, {ski,u}) and
the message MSG is calculated.
Writing to the Cloud
To write to an already existing file, the user must send
its message with the claim policy as done during file
creation. The cloud verifies the claim policy, and only
if the user is authentic, is allowed to write on the file.
User Revocation
We have just discussed how to prevent replay attacks.
We will now discuss how to handle user revocation. It
should be ensured that users must not have the ability to
access data, even if they possess matching set of
attributes. For this reason, the owners should change the
stored data and send updated information to other users.
The set of attributes Iu possessed by the revoked user Uu
is noted and all users change their stored data that have
attributes I € Iu. In [5], revocation involved changing
the public and secret keys of the minimal set of
attributes which are required to decrypt the data. We do
not consider this approach because here different data
are encrypted by the same set of attributes, so such a
minimal set of attributes is different for different users.
Therefore, this does not apply to our model. Once the
attributes Iu are identified, all data that possess the
attributes are collected. For each such data record, the
following steps are then carried out:
REAL LIFE EXAMPLE
Figure 2: Example of Claim policy
We now revisit the problem we stated in the
introduction. We will use a relaxed setting. Suppose
Alice is a law student and wants to send a series of
reports about malpractices by authorities of University
X to all the professors of University X, Research chairs
of universities X; Y ;Z and students belonging to Law
department in university X. She wants to remain
anonymous, while publishing all evidence. All
information is stored in the cloud. It is important that
users should not be able to know her identity, but must
trust that the information is from a valid source. For this
reason she also sends a claim message which states that
she “Is a law student” or “Is a student counselor” or
“Professor at university X.” The tree corresponding to
the claim policy is shown in Fig. 2.
The leaves of the tree consists of attributes and the
intermediary nodes consists of Boolean operators. In
this example the attributes are “Student,” “Prof,” “Dept
Law,” “Uni X,” “Counselor.” The above claim policy
can be written as a Boolean function of attributes as
Later when a valid user, say Bob wants to modify
any of these reports he also attaches a set of claims
which the cloud verifies. For example, Bob is a
research chair and might send a claim “Research chair”
or “Department head” which is then verified by the
cloud. It then sends the encrypted data to the Bob. Since
Bob is a valid user and has matching attributes, he can
decrypt and get back the information. If Bob wants to
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read the contents without modifying them, then there is
no need to attach a claim. He will be able to decrypt
only if he is a Professor in University X or a Research
chair in one of the universities X; Y ;Z or a student
belonging to Department of Law in university X.
Here it is to be noted that the attributes can belong
to several KDCs. For example, the Professors
belonging to university X have credentials given by the
university X, and the Ph.D. degree from a University P,
the student counselor might be a psychologist
authorized by the Canadian Psychological Association
and assigned an employee number by a university, the
research chairs can be jointly appointed by the
universities X, Y , Z and the government. The students
can have credentials from the university and also a
department.
Reading from the Cloud and Modifying Data
Suppose Bob wants to access the records stored by
Alice. Bob then decrypts the message MSG using his
secret keys using function ABE:Decrypt. Writing proceeds
like file creation. It is to be noted that the time is added
to the data so that even if Bob’s credentials are revoked,
he cannot write stale data in the cloud.
III. RELATED WORK
ABE was proposed by Sahai and Waters [6]. In
ABE, a user has a set of attributes in addition to its
unique ID. There are two classes of ABEs. In key-
policy ABE or KP-ABE (Goyal et al. [7]), the sender
has an access policy to encrypt data. A writer whose
attributes and keys have been revoked cannot write
back stale information. The receiver receives attributes
and secret keys from the attribute authority and is able
to decrypt information if it has matching attributes. In
Ciphertext-policy, CP-ABE ([8], [9]), the receiver has
the access policy in the form of a tree, with attributes as
leaves and monotonic access structure with AND, OR
and other threshold gates.
All the approaches take a centralized approach and
allow only one KDC, which is a single point of failure.
Chase proposed a multiauthority ABE, in which there
are several KDC authorities (coordinated by a trusted
authority) which distribute attributes and secret keys to
users. Multiauthority ABE protocol was studied [10],
which required no trusted authority which requires
every user to have attributes from at all the KDCs.
Recently, Lewko and Waters  proposed a fully
decentralized ABE where users could have zero or
more attributes from each authority and did not require
a trusted server. In all these cases, decryption at user’s
end is computation intensive. So, this technique might
be inefficient when users access using their mobile
devices. To get over this problem, Green et al. [11]
proposed to outsource the decryption task to a proxy
server, so that the user can compute with minimum
resources (for example, hand held devices). However,
the presence of one proxy and one KDC makes it less
robust than decentralized approaches. Both these
approaches had no way to authenticate users,
anonymously. Yang et al. [34] presented a modification
of [33], authenticate users, who want to remain
anonymous while accessing the cloud.
To ensure anonymous user authentication ABSs
were introduced by Maji et al. [12]. This was also a
centralized approach. A recent scheme by Maji et al.
takes a decentralized approach and provides
authentication without disclosing the identity of the
users. However, as mentioned earlier in the previous
section it is prone to replay attack.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have presented a decentralized access control
technique with anonymous authentication, which
provides user revocation and prevents replay attacks.
The cloud does not know the identity of the user who
stores information, but only verifies the user’s
credentials. Key distribution is done in a decentralized
way. One limitation is that the cloud knows the access
policy for each record stored in the cloud. In future, we
would like to hide the attributes and access policy of a
user.
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